An Analysis of Pleasure: Selections from the Works of Pierre Gassendi (vegetarian), Part 2 of 2

Chapter 3 Wherein a Happy Life does consist. Whether all Pleasure be good of itself?

“[…] It is plain that pleasures alone are no impediments of wisdom or prudence, but rather the actions that accompany them; such actions I mean by which the spirits are too much spent, whereby the strength of the mind is weakened, and the judgment blinded. So, that when these mischiefs are charged upon pleasure, it is a paralogism or deceitful way of arguing […]; when that which is not the cause, is taken for the cause; as if the evil which ought to be ascribed to the poison, be attributed to the sweetness. Thus, by consequence, that which may be said in respect of diseases and poverty, and other inconveniences which commonly succeed, is that pleasure simply considered as it is pleasure, is not the cause of these evils, but rather gluttony, the excess of wine and meats prepared with sauces, which tempt us to exceed the bounds of moderation, whence proceed fevers and other grievous distempers. So also from the excess of venery proceed the disease of the gout and other shameful maladies, accompanied with a numerous train other mischiefs. […]”

Of the first Good that Nature has in it's View.

“That we may come at last to Epicurus’s Opinion, that pleasure is our main end, we must consider, that the reason that induced him to this opinion was, that he considered pleasure generally and simply in its own nature, or else as it is managed and directed by prudence and wisdom: for it is in this manner also, that Alexander observes, that we are to distinguish the matter, when he said, that pleasure according to the judgment of Epicurus, is the first good that nature pursues, or the first good unto which we are naturally bent and inclined; but afterwards this pleasure is regulated and directed by wisdom and prudence. […]

Seeing there are three sorts of things named good: […] the honest, the useful, and the pleasant; the latter is common to the rest, for the honest and the useful seem to be also pleasant and grateful. From hence therefore we may infer, that good and pleasant are but different names for the same thing; and that good is good, and described to be what all creatures desire, only because it is grateful and pleasing; and by consequence that that good which is pleasing, is desired for the pleasure it affords. […]”